Revised Hazard Report List

					A. NUMBER				B. PHASE		C. DATE
	FLIGHT PAYLOAD STANDARDIZED HAZARD CONTROL REPORT				STD-			AMS-02-F01	Phase II		October 21, 2004
	D. PAYLOAD, DTO, DSO or RME (Include Part Number(s), if applicable)				HAZARD TITLE					E. VEHICLE
	Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer –02 (AMS-02) (Exterior Elements – See attached list)				STANDARD HAZARDS					*Shuttle – International Space Station*
	F. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:			G. HAZARD CONTROLS: (complies with)	H. APP.	I. VERIFICATION METHOD, REFERENCE AND STATUS:
	1. Structural Failure ( payloads must comply with the listed requirements for all phases of flight) Note: Locker and Soft Stowage items only			a) Designed to meet the standard modular locker stowage requirements of NSTS 21000-IDD-MDK or equivalent IDD___________, or b) Stowed in SPACEHAB per MDC91W5023.		Reference AMS-02-F01
	2. Structural Failure of Sealed Containers			Sealed containers must meet the criteria of NASA-STD-5003, Para. 4.2.2.4.2.3a, contain a substance which is not a catastrophic hazard if released, be made of conventional metals, and have a maximum delta pressure of 1.5 atm.		This hazard is not applicable, the AMS-02 does not make use of sealed containers within its design
	3. Structural Failure of Vented Containers			For intentionally vented containers, vents are sized to maintain a 1.4 factor of safety for Shuttle or a 1.5 factor of safety for Station with respect to pressure loads. Meets all of the applicable pressure rates defined for one or more of the following: i. Shuttle payload bay – ICD 2-19001, Para. 10.6.1 ii. Station environment – SSP 52005, paragraph 4.1.12 or equivalent payload specific ICD ______. iii. Station PFE discharge – SSP 57000, Para. 3.1.1.4K, or equivalent payload specific ICD ______.		i.1. Attachment 1 to STD-AMS-02-F01 provides a tabular listing of the AMS-02 enclosed volumes with a description of the venting provided and the verification for closure of the control compliance.
	4. Sharp Edges			Meets the intent of one or more of the following: a) NASA-STD-3000 / SSP 50005 b) SLP 2104 c) NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 7 (EVA hardware) d) NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 9 (IVA hardware) / SSP 57000		Reference AMS-02-F14 NOTE THAT THERE ARE SHARP EDGES ON THE STAR TRACKER BAFFLE, USE OF 1230 FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE.
	5. Shatterable Material Release			a) All materials are contained. b) Optical glass (i.e. lenses, filters, etc.) components of crew cabin experiment hardware that are non-stressed (no delta pressure) and have passed both a vibration test at flight levels and a post-test visual inspection. c) Payload bay hardware shatterable material components that weigh less than 0.25 lb and are non-stressed (no delta pressure) or non-structural.		Reference AMS-02-F17. Hardware exists in Orbiter payload bay and on ISS exterior, the latter condition not provided for in JSC Form 1230.
	6. Flammable Materials			a) A-rated materials selected from MAPTIS, or b) Flammability assessment per NSTS 22648		b.1. Flammability assessment approved by JSC/EP5
	7. Materials Offgassing			a) Offgassing tests of assembled article per NHB 8060.1 and/or NASA-STD-6001.		N/A- Exterior elements only in this hazard report
	8. Nonionizing Radiation 8.1 Non-transmitters			a) Pass ICD-2-19001, 10.7.3.2.2 / SSP 30238 EMI compatibility testing, or b) NSTS/USA approved analysis ICD Section 20, or c) ISS/EMEP approved TIA		Reference AMS-02-F07. Hardware exists in payload bay and on ISS exterior, the latter condition not addressed in JSC Form 1230.
	8.2 Lasers			a) Beams are totally contained at the maximum possible power and there is no crew access, or b) Meet ANSI Z136.1-1993 for class 1, 2, or 3a Lasers (as measured at the source).		Tracker Alignment System laser beam path is entirely enclosed, utilizing fiber optics cables and a light tight Tracker Structure. a.1. Review of Design for Implementation of light tight path. a.2. Review of as built hardware for implementation of enclosed light path.
	9. Battery Failure (use of this form is limited to small commercial batteries as listed below) 9.1 Alkaline-MnO₂, Carbon- Zn, or Zn-Air in sizes D or smaller having 6 or fewer cells either all in parallel or all in series (series/parallel combinations require a unique hazard report), no potential charging source, and cells are in a vented compartment. 9.2 Li-CFx, Li-Iodine, Li-MnO₂, Ni-Cd, Ni-MH, or Ag-Zn which have a capacity of 200 mAh or less, and no more than 2 cells per common circuit.			Pass acceptance tests which include open circuit & loaded voltage measurements, visual examination, and leakage check under vacuum (e.g. 6 hours at 0.1 psia). Note: Above acceptance testing for button cells in Section 9.2 which are soldered to a circuit board in commercial equipment (not applicable to those button cells in a spring-loaded clip) is limited to a functional check of the equipment utilizing the subject battery.		Reference AMS-02-F13 NOTE – The UPS exceed this criterion for size and application.
	10. Touch Temperature			a) Within IVA touch temperature range of –18 Degrees C (0 Degrees F) and 49 Degrees C (120 Decrees F) and satisfies the intentional contact constraints of letter, MA2-95-048 (if applicable). b) Meets EVA touch temperature criteria of NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 7.		Reference AMS-02-F14
	11. Electrical Power Distribution			a) Shuttle powered payload – Meets all circuit protection requirements of Letter TA-92-038. b) Station powered payload – Meets station interface circuit protection requirements of SSP 57000 and payload circuit protection requirements of Letter TA-92-038.		Reference AMS-02-F18. JSC Form 1230 does not address power supplied by exterior circuitry of ISS or power received by SSRMS.
	12. Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres in Payload Bay			All ignition sources in the Payload bay, for launch and landing, are controlled as required in Letter NS2/81-MO82, and MLI grounded per ICD 2-19001.		a. Review of Design to confirm no arcing/sparking components powered during ascent. b. Thermal analysis to confirm no component will operate or fail exceeding autoignition temperature c. Bonding and grounding testing of MLI
	13. Rotating Equipment			Rotating equipment meets criteria of NASA-STD-5003 for obvious containment.		<< NEED INFO ON PUMPS ETC>>
	14. Mating/demating powered connectors			a) Meets the low power criteria of letter MA2-99-170 or b) Meets the paragraph 1 criteria of letter MA2-99-170 (e.g., IVA and open circuit voltage no greater than 32 volts).		Reference AMS-02-F12
15. Contingency Return and Rapid Safing			Shuttle Environment: a) If middeck payload can be stowed within 50 min. (see paragraph 3 of letter MA2-96-190). b) If transfer item can establish a safe for return configuration within 3 min. (see paragraph 5 of letter MA2-96-190). Station environment: c) Payload design does not impede emergency IVA egress to the remaining adjacent pressurized volumes.				Reference AMS-02-F19
16 Release of Mercury from bulbs into crew habitable environment.			a) Mercury vapor bulbs contain less than 30 mg of mercury per bulb, and b) No more than one bulb could break due to a single failure.				N/A – This hazard report addresses only exterior elements – No Mercury Used
APPROVAL		PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION					SSP/ISS
PHASE I
PHASE II
PHASE III

Attachment 1 to STD-AMS-02-01 – Vented Containers/Structures

Ref	Item	Function	Vented/Structural Loads	Verification Method	Verification Status
	Structures
	USS-02	Primary Structural Path. Composed of aluminum tubes.




	Avionics Boxes Need to be listed
	E-Crate
	EHV
	EPD
	J-Crate
	JT-Crate
	JPD
	M-Crate
	MPD
	RHV
	RPD
	S-Crate
	SHV
	SPD
	T-Crate
	TPD
	TT-Crate
	TTPD
	U-Crate
	UPD
	UG-Crate
	UGPD
	ASTC
	GPS
	PDS
	CAB
	CCEB
	CDD-P, -S
	UPS
	CVB
	TTCB-P, -S
	UGB

	MLI/thermal blankets need to be listed


	Experiments:
	TRD	Structure to contain sensor proportional tubes	Structure is heavily perforated to support sensor tubes.	Review of Design
	TOF
	Tracker
	Star Tracker
	RICH
	ECAL

	Other enclosed volumes?

					A. NUMBER			B. PHASE		C. DATE
	FLIGHT PAYLOAD STANDARDIZED HAZARD CONTROL REPORT				STD-		AMS-02-F02	Phase II		October 21, 2004
	D. PAYLOAD, DTO, DSO or RME (Include Part Number(s), if applicable)				HAZARD TITLE				E. VEHICLE
	Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer –02 (AMS-02) (Interior Elements – See attached list)				STANDARD HAZARDS				Shuttle (only)
	F. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:			G. HAZARD CONTROLS: (complies with)	H. APP.		I. VERIFICATION METHOD, REFERENCE AND STATUS:
	2. Structural Failure ( payloads must comply with the listed requirements for all phases of flight) Note: Locker and Soft Stowage items only			a) Designed to meet the standard modular locker stowage requirements of NSTS 21000-IDD-MDK or equivalent IDD___________, or b) Stowed in SPACEHAB per MDC91W5023.			1a). Open. Review of installation drawings. 1b). Open. Weight/CG Analysis for stowage location.
	2. Structural Failure of Sealed Containers			Sealed containers must meet the criteria of NASA-STD-5003, Para. 4.2.2.4.2.3a, contain a substance which is not a catastrophic hazard if released, be made of conventional metals, and have a maximum delta pressure of 1.5 atm.			N/A
	3. Structural Failure of Vented Containers			For intentionally vented containers, vents are sized to maintain a 1.4 factor of safety for Shuttle or a 1.5 factor of safety for Station with respect to pressure loads. Meets all of the applicable pressure rates defined for one or more of the following: i. Shuttle payload bay – ICD 2-19001, Para. 10.6.1 ii. Station environment – SSP 52005, paragraph 4.1.12 or equivalent payload specific ICD ______. iii. Station PFE discharge – SSP 57000, Para. 3.1.1.4K, or equivalent payload specific ICD ______.			N/A
	4. Sharp Edges			Meets the intent of one or more of the following: e) NASA-STD-3000 / SSP 50005 f) SLP 2104 g) NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 7 (EVA hardware) h) NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 9 (IVA hardware) / SSP 57000			AMS provided Card will reside within the PGSC, cables and connectors. 4a. Open. Inspection of Flight Hardware for sharp edges, corners and protrusions.
	5. Shatterable Material Release			a) All materials are contained. b) Optical glass (i.e. lenses, filters, etc.) components of crew cabin experiment hardware that are non-stressed (no delta pressure) and have passed both a vibration test at flight levels and a post-test visual inspection. c) Payload bay hardware shatterable material components that weigh less than 0.25 lb and are non-stressed (no delta pressure) or non-structural.			N/A
	6. Flammable Materials			a) A-rated materials selected from MAPTIS, or b) Flammability assessment per NSTS 22648			6a. Open. Review of design for appropriate use of non-flammable materials.
	7. Materials Offgassing			a) Offgassing tests of assembled article per NHB 8060.1 and/or NASA-STD-6001.			7a. Open. Offgassing test results reviewed and approved.
	8. Nonionizing Radiation 8.1 Non-transmitters			a) Pass ICD-2-19001, 10.7.3.2.2 / SSP 30238 EMI compatibility testing, or b) NSTS/USA approved analysis ICD Section 20, or c) ISS/EMEP approved TIA			8.1a. Open. EMI testing results reviewed and approved.
	8.2 Lasers			c) Beams are totally contained at the maximum possible power and there is no crew access, or d) Meet ANSI Z136.1-1993 for class 1, 2, or 3a Lasers (as measured at the source).			N/A
	9. Battery Failure (use of this form is limited to small commercial batteries as listed below) 9.1 Alkaline-MnO₂, Carbon- Zn, or Zn-Air in sizes D or smaller having 6 or fewer cells either all in parallel or all in series (series/parallel combinations require a unique hazard report), no potential charging source, and cells are in a vented compartment. 9.2 Li-CFx, Li-Iodine, Li-MnO₂, Ni-Cd, Ni-MH, or Ag-Zn which have a capacity of 200 mAh or less, and no more than 2 cells per common circuit.			Pass acceptance tests which include open circuit & loaded voltage measurements, visual examination, and leakage check under vacuum (e.g. 6 hours at 0.1 psia). Note: Above acceptance testing for button cells in Section 9.2 which are soldered to a circuit board in commercial equipment (not applicable to those button cells in a spring-loaded clip) is limited to a functional check of the equipment utilizing the subject battery.			N/A
	10. Touch Temperature			a) Within IVA touch temperature range of –18 Degrees C (0 Degrees F) and 49 Degrees C (120 Decrees F) and satisfies the intentional contact constraints of letter, MA2-95-048 (if applicable). b) Meets EVA touch temperature criteria of NSTS 07700 Vol. XIV App. 7.			10.a.1 Open. Review of design to confirm power consuming elements inaccessible to the crew. 10.a.2 Open. Analysis to confirm that interface card will not induce excessive thermal load on PGSC.
	11. Electrical Power Distribution			a) Shuttle powered payload – Meets all circuit protection requirements of Letter TA-92-038. b) Station powered payload – Meets station interface circuit protection requirements of SSP 57000 and payload circuit protection requirements of Letter TA-92-038.			11.a. Open. Review of Design Note: The interface of the interface card is with the PGSC and is not directly interfaced with the Shuttle power systems.
	12. Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres in Payload Bay			All ignition sources in the Payload bay, for launch and landing, are controlled as required in Letter NS2/81-MO82, and MLI grounded per ICD 2-19001.			N/A
	13. Rotating Equipment			Rotating equipment meets criteria of NASA-STD-5003 for obvious containment.			N/A
	14. Mating/demating powered connectors			a) Meets the low power criteria of letter MA2-99-170 or b) Meets the paragraph 1 criteria of letter MA2-99-170 (e.g., IVA and open circuit voltage no greater than 32 volts).			14.a. Open. Review of Design. The Interface Card will be installed prior to flight and the data interface cable meets low power criteria.
15. Contingency Return and Rapid Safing			Shuttle Environment: a) If middeck payload can be stowed within 50 min. (see paragraph 3 of letter MA2-96-190). b) If transfer item can establish a safe for return configuration within 3 min. (see paragraph 5 of letter MA2-96-190). Station environment: c) Payload design does not impede emergency IVA egress to the remaining adjacent pressurized volumes.			15a. Open. Rapid Safing Assessment to establish that the PGSC and data cables can be stowed within 50 minutes.
16 Release of Mercury from bulbs into crew habitable environment.			a) Mercury vapor bulbs contain less than 30 mg of mercury per bulb, and b) No more than one bulb could break due to a single failure.			N/A – No mercury present.
APPROVAL		PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION				SSP/ISS
PHASE I
PHASE II
PHASE III

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer –02 (AMS-02) Interior Hardware Elements:

PGSC RS-422 Interface Card – Add description
PGSC to ACOP Data Cable – Add description of Cable

NOTE:

AMS Crew Operations Post (ACOP), will be addressed in a unique SDP
Payload General Support Equipment (GFE), not considered in STD-AMS-02-02, GFE is being used in accordance with its GFE certification.

Attachments:

Flammability Assessment

Toxicological/Offgassing testing results.

Electrical interface description spec sheet for the interface card and cable.

Cable information.

PAYLOAD FLIGHT HAZARD REPORT								a. NO:	AMS-02-F01
b. PAYLOAD		Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-02 (AMS-02)						c. PHASE:	II
d. SUBSYSTEM:		Structures			e. HAZARD GROUP:	Collision, Injury		f. DATE:	October 21, 2004
g. HAZARD TITLE:		Structural Failure of Hardware						i. HAZARD	CATASTROPHIC		X
g. HAZARD TITLE:		Structural Failure of Hardware						CATEGORY:	CRITICAL
h. APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:				NSTS 1700.7B and the ISS Addendum, 200.2, 208.1, 208.2, 208.3
j. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:				Failure of AMS Structures could injure crewmembers or damage the STS, ISS or other payloads. This hazard addresses does not address non-structural pressure systems or sealed/vented container failures.
k. CAUSES	1. Inadequate structural strength for worst-case loads during all mission phases. These loads include, but are not limited to: differential temperature, differential pressure, depressurization and repressurization, acoustics, sloshing of SFHe, ground transportation and handling, on-orbit (including transfer operations from the Orbiter to the ISS and crew induced) and magnet forces. 2. Use of structural materials with moderate or low resistance to stress corrosion cracking. 3. Initiation of propagation of flaws or crack-like defects. 4. Use of counterfeit, substandard or inadequate fasteners. 5. Loosening of safety critical fasteners. 6. Loss of structural integrity of welds. 7. Improper manufacture and/ or assembly. 8. Improper preload or creeping of the Cryomagnet support system straps. 9. Damage to composite structural components during manufacturing, assembly operations, ground handling, and/or ground transportation. 10. Degradation of composite structural components by atomic oxygen.
(list)

o. APPROVAL			PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION				SSP/ISS
PHASE I
PHASE II
PHASE III

l. HAZARD CONTROL (CONTROL), m. SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS (SVM), n. STATUS OF VERIFICATIONS (STATUS)										OPS CONTROL
1. CAUSE: Inadequate structural strength for worst-case loads during all mission phases. These loads include, but are not limited to: differential temperature, differential pressure, depressurization and repressurization, acoustics, sloshing of SFHe, ground transportation and handling, on-orbit (including transfer operations from the Orbiter to the ISS and crew induced) and magnet forces.
1.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 hardware is being designed to have positive margins of safety during all mission phases. All metallic structures will be tested to 1.0 FOS (yield), 1.4 FOS (ultimate) or analyzed to 1.25 FOS (yield), 2.0 FOS (ultimate). Non-metallic structures will be tested/analyzed to 1.25 FOS (yield), 2.0 FOS (ultimate). Attached Table indicates FOS used and margins for structural components. 1.1.1 SVM: Review and approval of the AMS-02 Structural Verification Plan (SVP) (JSC 28792), which includes the requirements in NSTS 14046, by the JSC Structures Working group (SWG). Individual test plans derived from the SVP will be reviewed and approved by the JSC SWG. 1.1.2 SVM: Structural analysis will be performed to the appropriate factors of safety for all load conditions. Review and approval of the AMS-02 Structural Analysis Reports by the JSC SWG. 1.1.3 SVM: Static strength and strength model verification tests for the all-up configuration of the AMS-02 payload will be performed. Review and approval of the AMS-02 Static Correlation Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.4 SVM: Modal test on the all-up configuration of the AMS-02 payload and sine sweep test of the Structural Test Article (STA) cryogenic system will be performed for dynamic math model verification. Review and approval of the AMS-02 Modal Correlation Report and STA Sine Sweep Correlation Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.5 SVM: Stress and buckling analyses of the Cryomagnet Vacuum Case (VC) will be performed. Review and approval of the Cryomagnet VC Stress and Buckling Analyses by the JSC SWG. 1.1.6 SVM: Proof pressure test of the Cryomagnet Flight VC and the Structural Test Article (STA) VC will be performed. Review and approval of the Cryomagnet VC and STA VC Proof Pressure Test Plan and Test Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.7 SVM: An operating test of the Cryomagnet to 1.1 times the limit load will be performed. Review and approval of the Cryomagnet Operating Test Plan and Test Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.8 SVM: Qualification, acceptance, fatigue and development static and dynamic tests on the cryomagnet support system straps will be performed. Review and approval of the Cryomagnet Support System Straps Verification Test Plans and Test Reports by the JSC SWG. 1.1.9 SVM: Acoustic analysis of the TRD, TOF, TCS and Si Tracker has been performed. Acoustic test of the STA cryosystem will be performed. Review and approval of the Acoustic Analyses, Acoustic Test Plan and Acoustic Test Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.10 SVM: Sine sweep, "smart -hammer" or modal testing (by subsystem) will be performed to verify the first natural frequency that is below 50 Hz of the TRD, TOF, Si Tracker, RICH, ECAL, TCS and M/OD shields. Review and approval of the Sine Sweep, "Smart -Hammer" or Modal Test Plan and Test Report by the JSC SWG. 1.1.11 SVM: Static verification tests of the Payload Attach System (PAS) and Interface Verification Test (IVT) of the PAS to ISS S3 Zenith Inboard Active PAS 2 were performed. Review and approval of the Static Test Plan, IVT Plan and IVT verification memorandum by the ISS Structures Team. 1.1.12 SVM: Other subdetector items in the AMS-02 SVP will be verified by letters of certification per SVP. 1.1.1 STATUS: Open 1.1.2 STATUS: Open 1.1.3 STATUS: Open 1.1.4 STATUS: Open 1.1.5 STATUS: Open 1.1.6 STATUS: Open 1.1.7 STATUS: Open 1.1.8 STATUS: Open 1.1.9 STATUS: Open 1.1.10 STATUS: Open 1.1.11 STATUS: Open 1.1.12 STATUS: Open
1.2 CONTROL: SFHe tank feed through tubes are designed to physically isolate the Cryomagnet support system straps from bending, lateral or torsional loads. The Cryomagnet support system straps carry only axial loads. 1.2.1 SVM: Structural analysis will show that there is adequate clearance between the strap and the tube to prevent transfer of loads to the straps. 1.2.1 STATUS: Open
2. CAUSE: Use of structural materials with moderate or low resistance to stress corrosion cracking.
2.1 CONTROL: AMS-02 materials will be selected to meet the requirements of MSFC-STD-3029. Materials with high resistance to stress corrosion cracking will be used where possible. Materials with moderate or low resistance to stress corrosion cracking have MUAs that have been/will approved for each application. MUAs are attached to this hazard report. 2.1.1 SVM: Will be verified by stress corrosion evaluation of AMS-02 materials list, drawings, and inspection of hardware. Verification will be complete when JSC ES4/Materials and Processes Branch issues a Materials Certification Letter(s) for all MUAs/Design. 2.1.1 STATUS: Open
3. CAUSE: Initiation or propagation of flaws or crack-like defects.
3.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 project will use JSC-25863A to implement the fracture control requirements of NASA-STD-5003 and SSP-30558C. See attached table for fracture classification of each structural element. 3.1.1 SVM: Approval of JSC 25863A, Fracture Control Plan, by ES4/Materials and Processes Branch 3.1.2 SVM: Compliance with the fracture control requirements of NASA-STD-5003 and SSP-30558C will be verified by approval of fracture control summary by JSC ES4/Materials and Processes Branch. 3.1.1 STATUS: Open 3.1.2 STATUS: Open
4. CAUSE: Use of counterfeit, substandard or inadequate fasteners.
4.1 CONTROL: All fasteners, including safety critical fasteners contained in components supplied by subcontractors, #8 (~3mm) and larger are selected and tested in accordance with JSC 23642E. All fasteners #8 and larger are centrally procured and supplied to all organizations manufacturing flight hardware. 4.1.1 SVM: Certification documentation (including documentation for safety critical fasteners contained in components supplied by subcontractors) will be provided to verify that lot testing has been performed by JSC personnel to verify compliance with strength and chemical composition requirements of JSC-23642E. 4.1.1 STATUS: Open
4.2 CONTROL: All hardware with a releasable mass of 0.25 lbs. or larger will be attached with #8 or larger fasteners. 4.2.1 SVM: Review of drawings and as-built hardware by AMS-02 Project to ensure compliance. 4.2.1 STATUS: Open
5. CAUSE: Loosening of safety critical fasteners.
5.1 CONTROL: Safety-critical fasteners, including safety critical fasteners contained in components supplied by subcontractors, inadvertent back-off will be prevented by the use of locking inserts/nuts, self-locking bolts , safety wire or fastener preload/torque. (NOTE: No safety wire will be used on AMS-02 surfaces that are exposed in the Orbiter or on the ISS.) 5.1.1 SVM: Certification documentation (including documentation for safety critical fasteners contained in components supplied by subcontractors) will be provided to verify that locking inserts, locking nuts, safety wire or appropriate pre-load/torque were used. 5.1.1 STATUS: Open
6. CAUSE: Loss of structural integrity of welds.
6.1 CONTROL: The welds will have positive margins of safety during all mission phases, for the factors of safety specified in Control 1.1. 6.1.1 SVM: Structural Analysis demonstrating positive margin of safety 6.1.4 SVM: Static testing will be performed. 6.1.1 STATUS: Open 6.1.2 STATUS: Open
6.2 CONTROL: Welding Processes are controlled by implementation of the AMS-02 Weld Control Plan. 6.2.1 SVM: Review and approval of AMS-02 Weld Control Plan by ES4/Materials and Processes Branch. 6.2.2 SVM: Certificate of Compliance with AMS-02 Weld Control Plan 6.2.3 SVM: Welds will be inspected: Dye Penetrant, Ultrasound, X-ray 6.2.1 STATUS: Open 6.2.2 STATUS: Open 6.2.3 STATUS: Open
7. CAUSE: Improper manufacture and/ or assembly.
7.1 CONTROL: Approved drawings and procedures, including tool control, will be used for manufacturing and assembly. 7.1.1 SVM: Certification documentation will be provided to verify proper manufacturing/assembly of AMS-02 hardware (including all composite materials). 7.1.1 STATUS: Open
8. CAUSE: Improper preload or creeping of the Cryomagnet support system straps.
8.1 CONTROL: Cryomagnet support system straps will be preloaded prior to flight to provide a balanced support load for the Cryomagnet. The C1W1 (x axis) straps will be preloaded to 1830 lbs prior to installation, the C2W2 (y axis) straps will be preloaded to 1750 lbs. The Cryomagnet support system straps can function properly with a minimum preload of 300 lbs. Preload is established by compressing a Belleville washer stack on a freestanding jig prior to installation. Preload strain measurements are made in conjunction with the initial setup. After installation and prior to launch this strain measurement is made to confirm that preload has not been lost. 8.1.1 SVM: Verify preload at time of installation 8.1.2 SVM: Cryomagnet support system straps will be tested prior to launch at KSC (approximately L-4 months) to ensure that they are within an acceptable tolerance of the specified preload value. 8.1.3 SVM: Long term creep testing to ensure that the Cryomagnet support system straps will not be out of tolerance for any flight regime or over the life of the payload. 8.1.4 SVM: Review and approval of test plans and data by JSC Structures Working Group. 8.1.1 STATUS: Open 8.1.2 STATUS: Open 8.1.3 STATUS: Open 8.1.4 STATUS: Open
9. CAUSE: Damage to composite structural components during manufacturing, assembly operations, ground handling, and/or ground transportation.
9.1 CONTROL: Each supplier/developer of composite structures will provide special handling procedures and requirements which are developed into work instructions for manufacturing, assembly operations, ground handling and/or ground transportation. Quality assurance representatives oversee the implementation of these work instructions to protect the composite structures. 9.1.1 SVM: QA review of procedures and certification of procedure completion. 9.1.1 STATUS: Open
10. CAUSE: Degradation of composite structural components by atomic oxygen.
10.1 CONTROL: All composite structures are covered with thermal blankets, structures and/or coatings to assure non-metallic components are not in a direct line of sight of atomic oxygen. 10.1.1 SVM: Review of drawings and as built hardware by hardware provider to ensure compliance. 10.1.1 STATUS: Open
Notes:

Attach Structural Tables.

Attach Cryomagnet support system strap data (creep)

Attach MUAs

Hazard Report Identifier	Hazard Report Title	Page
STD-AMS-02-F01	Flight Payload Standard Hazard Report – Exterior Elements	2
STD-AMS-02-F02	Flight Payload Standard Hazard Report – Interior Elements	8
AMS-02-F01	Structural Failure of Hardware	13
AMS-02-F02	Toxic Material Offgassing	20
AMS-02-F03	Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank, Vacuum Case and/or Pressurized System	21
AMS-02-F04	Overpressurization of Payload Bay Doors	43
AMS-02-F05	Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized Systems: TRD Gas System (Xe & CO₂), Cryomagnet Warm He System, Thermal Control System	58
AMS-02-F06	Excessive Thrust/Overturning Moments	67
AMS-02-F07	Excessive Radiated Field Strengths, EMI, Magnetic	73
AMS-02-F08	Electric Shock/Discharge	89
AMS-02-F09	Exposure of the Crew to Excessive Ionizing Radiation	97
AMS-02-F10	Flammable Materials in the Payload Bay	103
AMS-02-F11	Mechanism Failure	114
AMS-02-F12	Mate/Demate of Connectors	127
AMS-02-F13	Battery Failure	140
AMS-02-F14	EVA Operations Hazard	152
AMS-02-F15	Thermal Extremes	157
AMS-02-F16	Shatterable Material Release	162
AMS-02-F17	Electrical Power Distribution Damage	169
AMS-02-F18	Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfiguration	174

PAYLOAD FLIGHT HAZARD REPORT

Unique Hazard Report Deleted Hazard Transferred to STD-AMS-02-F02 PAYLOAD FLIGHT HAZARD REPORT

Unique Hazard Report Deleted

Hazard Transferred to STD-AMS-02-F02

PAYLOAD FLIGHT HAZARD REPORT